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GOD AND PRIVACY 
Margaret Falls-Corbitt and F. Michael McLain 
Contemporary reflection about God which includes certain assumptions 
raises for us the issue of God and privacy. Some philosophers believe that 
there is an obligation to respect privacy grounded in our basic moral duty to 
respect the autonomous choices of persons. If this is correct, and if it is correct 
to think of God as one whose actions perfectly accord with moral duties, then 
there is a prima facie case for thinking that God respects our privacy. We 
explore this thesis by considering the most plausible objections to it, includ-
ing matters of religious practice. 
The issue of God and privacy arises from consideration of the contemporary 
theistic conception of God as an all-powerful but "self-limiting" being who 
chose to bring into being creatures with a significant freedom, a libertarian 
freedom which creatures use to shape in part their destinies as they struggle 
with the perils of moral choice. The virtue of this position is that it recognizes 
that a God who creates significantly free choice and always allows its exercise 
limits divine power. Since libertarian choice cannot both be free and deter-
mined, a God who always values autonomous choice will not use divine 
power to override it. Some philosophers have placed logical limits on the 
scope of divine omniscience as well; they have argued for such limits in the 
case of the possible and future contingents. l But it is assumed by all that God 
necessarily knows all truths about the past and present. In this essay we argue 
that if God so values human freedom, then a very strong case can be made 
that God also chooses to limit divine knowledge in a way that respects 
privacy. That is, though God's knowledge of what is true could include every 
innermost thought and feeling of each of us, God chooses instead to grant 
humans the choice of self-disclosure. 
Our argument to this effect employs a certain analysis of the value of 
respect for privacy among humans and maintains that this value tells us 
something about divine respect for privacy. In making this move from human 
relationships to the divine-human relationship we make two assumptions 
typically, but not un controversially, shared by those who maintain that God 
is self-limiting and humans free. The first assumption is that God desires and 
commands that we use our freedom to develop good moral character and to 
cultivate relationships of love and trust with others and with God.2 The second 
assumption-presently more subject to debate-is that a proper explication 
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY 
Vol. 9 No.3 July 1992 
All rights reserved. 
369 
370 Faith and Philosophy 
of divine goodness includes reference to that which is morally good. 3 That 
is, reflection on principles which morally bind human conduct legitimately 
serves as a guide to the character of divine action, either because God 
shares the duties which these principles detail4 or because these principles 
specify the moral value freely and unobligedly actualized out of divine 
benevolence. 
1 
We begin our exploration of God and privacy with an account of the nature 
of privacy and the moral basis for respecting it in human-to-human relation-
ships. In proposing this account we assume a Kantian stance, accepting as 
fundamental and absolute our obligation to respect the autonomy of persons. 
"Privacy," as some use it, refers to the lack of information which others 
have about one. Accordingly, the less information others have about an indi-
vidual the more privacy that individual has. But this understanding of privacy 
makes the notion of violating another's privacy difficult to understand. We 
do not violate a friend's privacy by knowing great numbers of intimate details 
she freely reveals to us; we do violate her privacy if instead we learn those 
same details from surreptitiously reading her diary. In its important moral 
sense "privacy" refers to our ability to control others' access to informa-
tion about us, to the intimacies of our lives, to our thoughts, and to our 
bodies.s 
Of course, complete control seems impossible since any public contact may 
inadvertently reveal information. For example, a student may only intend to 
reveal a set of facts about his failed romantic relationship while, from both 
the facts and body language, the teacher accurately surmises a history of 
family problems and psychological trauma. What is important nonetheless is 
that individuals retain control over when, where and to whom they make 
explicit self-revelations and over the conditions under which they put them-
selves in a position which risks inadvertently providing information. The 
student in the above example chose to risk a personal conversation with the 
teacher. 
We respect others' privacy, then, by allowing them to choose the circum-
stances in which they do or do not make or risk self-revelation. Respecting 
the autonomy of others also has to do with respecting their choices, and so 
a very important connection between respecting privacy and respecting au-
tonomy is immediately apparent. 
We are morally obligated to respect the autonomy of persons. Respecting 
another's autonomy does not require that we let her do whatever she desires. 
It does require that we not do to her whatever we desire irrespective of her 
preferences, aims and intentions. We must allow her choices, especially her 
well-informed decisions, to be centrally determinative of what happens to 
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her. In other words, that she chooses X is a prima facie reason for our allowing 
her to do X and the fact that her doing X interferes with our plans or even 
the plans of the majority is not a morally sufficient reason for denying her 
the opportunity to do X. That X is morally wrong and fails to show respect 
for the chooser's own autonomy or the autonomy of others is a morally 
sufficient reason for such a denial. That a person does not want us to observe 
his body, know his history or read his thoughts is a prima facie moral reason 
for not doing these things. Respecting privacy, in other words, is a prima 
facie duty derived from our fundamental duty to respect the autonomy of 
persons. Yet it may conflict with and be overridden by some other prima facie 
obligation also derived from our obligation to respect autonomy. 
What does this conclusion regarding humans imply regarding God? Added 
to the assumptions stated above regarding human and divine goodness, this 
analysis of the moral value of privacy makes an initially strong case for the 
position that God shows prima facie regard for our privacy by allowing us to 
choose whether and when to make self-disclosure before God. Above we 
assumed that a proper understanding of moral principles binding upon hu-
mans reveals also the character of divine activity towards humans either 
because it discloses like duties for God or because it describes moral value 
actualized by unobliged divine benevolence. On the "duty model," the above 
moral analysis of privacy gives a very strong case for the view that God 
acknowledges a divine prima facie moral duty to respect an individual's 
choice not to disclose information to God. On the "benevolence model," the 
analysis of privacy gives initially very strong reasons for believing that God, 
out of freely chosen goodness, would require of Godself overriding reasons 
to violate an individual's choice against self-disclosure. For the sake of sim-
plicity, we refer to both of these versions as the position that God shows 
prima facie regard for our privacy. 
Our initial argument regarding God and privacy has been that a strong case 
can be made for God's prima facie regard for our privacy, based on the 
assumed view of divine goodness along with the derivation of a prima facie 
duty to respect privacy from an absolute duty to respect autonomy. This gives 
us only a prima facie regard for privacy because there may be circumstances 
in which God's respecting an individual's privacy would conflict with some 
other more stringent duty or more benevolent act also derived from God's 
duty or benevolent intention to respect autonomy. In this essay we will not 
investigate what other possibly conflicting duties might be involved, or what 
would count as a morally sufficient reason for God not to respect an 
individual's choice not to bring an idea, judgement, or feeling before God's 
purview. Rather we shall explore and defend the initial argument for a strong 
case for God's prima facie regard of human privacy. We do so by examining 
a set of possible objections. 
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We foresee three basic ways to challenge our initial argument. The first 
two objections have in common the claim that despite the earlier assumption 
regarding the likeness of human morality and divine activity, there just are 
reasons in this case to deny the connection. The first argument along these 
lines-objection (A), we will call it-would challenge our initial argument 
on the ground that God's nature is such that, unlike humans, God can respect 
our autonomy without respecting our privacy. The second-that is objection 
(B)-would be that perhaps God's authority over us is such that, unlike fellow 
humans, God is neither obligated nor benevolently determined to respect out 
autonomy, and thus morally need not have prima facie regard for our privacy. 
The third objection-(C)-would be to marshall such compelling reasons to 
believe that God does, or ought to (in some sense other than that held by the 
initial argument), know the inner recesses of human thought that this initial 
case to the contrary is overridden. 
In the remainder of this section and in section (3) we offer a response to 
objection (A) and a three-part response to objection (B). In section (4) we 
answer objection (C). We maintain that our responses to these criticisms 
ultimately build a cumulative argument that strengthens the initial argument 
for God's respect for privacy. 
Objection A. Our initial argument maintains that respect for autonomy 
requires prima facie regard for privacy. Yet, it might be objected that the 
connection between autonomy and privacy in human affairs is due to the 
corrupted nature of the creature which the Creator does not share. Our fellow 
humans may trick us, keeping us uncertain of whether we are observed. They 
may delight in abusing their knowledge about us; or they might intend to use 
it well but lack the power or the knowledge to do so. For all these reasons, 
human disrespect for privacy does threaten our ability to control our lives in 
accordance with our choices. But, the objection continues, God's perfection 
protects us from imagined misuse or abuse of divine knowledge about us. 
God's omnibenevolence, omnipotence, and omniscience all mean that we 
need not fear the malevolent use or bumbling abuse of our secrets. Addition-
ally, God's omnipresence means that we are not in doubt as to when God 
observes, namely always. 
Reply to (A). We agree that the possible abuse of personal information is a 
good reason to fear human disregard for privacy but not orthodox divine 
omniscience. But the initial argument deriving respect for privacy from re-
spect for autonomy did not depend on any contingent claims regarding what 
happens when information about us is abused either accidentally or intention-
ally. The argument is rather that failure to respect an individual's choice to 
withhold information about herself is, in and of itself, a failure to respect her 
autonomy unless there are intervening morally relevant factors. Therefore, 
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the impossibility that an all-good, all-knowing, all-powerful God will misuse 
knowledge about us, does not make the moral duty to respect privacy any 
less applicable to God. 
God's omnipresence and the certainty of divine observation as compared 
to uncertainty in the human case also would not make God's disregard for 
our choice of privacy any less a disregard for our autonomy. For, it is not the 
covert nature of a violation of privacy which makes if morally blameworthy. 
That Winston, in Orwell's 1984, could trust the "Thought Police" to watch 
and win in the end makes their access to his mind no less a violation of his 
privacy or his autonomy. Again, it is the disruption of choice itself, not its 
covert or overt nature, that makes the disregard for privacy prima facie a 
violation of our autonomy and thus, in the absence of morally overriding 
factors, morally wrong.6 
Objection (B). The first objection to our initial argument that there is a 
connection between God's respect for autonomy and divine prima facie re-
spect for privacy fails. A second line of attack would grant this connection 
but deny that God has morally compelling grounds for respecting autonomy 
such as bind our fellow humans. As an explanation for humans' obligation to 
respect each others' autonomy the objector might claim that human-to-
human, each individual is her own proper moral authority only because every 
human is morally fallible, and no adult human has a natural, uncontested 
authority over another. Rather, authority must be gained through "freely" 
entered into relationships such as citizen/state or teacher/student. God, by 
comparison, is morally infallible, asking of us only what is truly good, and 
has an uncontestable relationship to us as our Creator. As a result, his objec-
tion concludes, God has ultimate moral authority over us and our God-given 
autonomy does not morally bind the divine nor compel divine respect. 
Reply to (B)-part (i). We agree that God, considered abstractly as the 
all-morally-wise creator, need not be seen as one who must respect our au-
tonomy. In reply we will not attempt to deal with every aspect of the complex 
issue of God and human autonomy. Our argument is that this abstract con-
sideration of the issue overlooks the connection between respecting autonomy 
and respecting the conditions for becoming an autonomous person. The pur-
poses for us which we presumed above to be God-given show God's interest 
in our becoming autonomous in at least the limited sense of our becoming 
morally accountable beings of a certain kind. Our reply to (B), therefore, will 
be that divine respect for privacy is necessary for us to become the autono-
mous persons required by God's purposes. 
We, and most theists who posit God's creation of significantly free humans, 
believe that God intends us to use our freedom to become responsible moral 
agents capable of relationships of love and trust with others and with God. 
Furthermore, God not only intends this for us but holds us accountable for 
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becoming such. Granted God's moral authority over us, what if it is further 
the case that we cannot become the kind of creatures God intends and holds 
us accountable for becoming unless God respects our autonomy and privacy? 
It then would follow, we believe, that for both moral and nonmoral reasons 
God must show prima facie regard for human privacy. If divine respect for 
privacy proves necessary for our becoming morally accountable beings who 
can enter relationships of trust and love, a God who does not respect privacy 
acts inconsistently, frustrating God's own purposes, and is morally flawed, 
holding accountable creatures who, by God's own doing, cannot become what 
they are commanded to become. Such a God would not be a maximally 
perfect being. 
We think the case for this connection between the supposed divine purpose 
and divine respect for privacy is strong and we shall make it by first consid-
ering in section (3), part (ii) of our reply to (B), the detrimental effects which 
human disregard for privacy has on moral development and on trust and 
intimacy, crucial components of love. We then argue in (3), rely to (B)-part 
(iii), that divine disregard for human privacy would be likely to have similar 
detrimental effects and hence would be subject to the moral criticism that 
God holds us accountable for what God makes it impossible for us to achieve. 
If sound, our reasoning overturns the objection based on God's moral author-
ity over us. 
3 
Reply to (B)-part (U). The literature on the moral significance of privacy 
identifies effects which a lack of respect for privacy has on individuals' 
ability to develop their capacities for responsible moral agency and for rela-
tionships of trust and intimacy. In so far as these capacities are central to 
personhood, the literature argues, then respect for privacy is necessary for 
meeting our moral obligation to respect persons. In this part of section (3) 
we use insights from this literature to show that in order to become respon-
sible moral agents and trusting, loving persons, we need to be able to count 
on our fellow human beings to respect our privacy, i.e., to show prima facie 
regard for our desire not to reveal ourselves in particular ways in particular 
circumstances to particular or all fellow humans. In (B)-part (iii) we inves-
tigate to what extent this conclusion also extends to relationships with the 
divine. 
Responsible agents must first and foremost be capable of holding them-
selves accountable for doing what is right and good; they must recognize 
others as having moral claims against them and themselves as having moral 
claims against others. This complex ability requires a certain conception of 
the self, a conception of the self with which we are not born and do not 
necessarily develop or maintain. If forever treated as mere dependents, slaves 
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or tools of other humans' will and satisfaction, it is extremely difficult to 
think of ourselves as responsible agents or as people who can rightfully 
demand that certain things not be done to us or to others. 
Of course, coercion or general disregard for a person's preferences-in the 
absence of morally sufficient reasons for doing so-is a form of treating that 
person as our tool and, for the moment at least, as our "slave" and not as a 
rightfully independent self, or person. But this is the case to an extraordinary 
degree when the choice ignored or overridden is the individual's choice to 
maintain privacy. For by violating (for no moral reason) his claim against our 
intrusion into what he took to be uniquely his domain, we deny that he is his 
own person, possessing a special relationship to his own thoughts, feelings 
or personal history. 
It is for this reason that Jeffrey Reiman has correctly spoken of respect for 
privacy as a "social ritual by means of which an individual's moral title to 
his existence is conferred. "7 Reiman writes that "moral ownership in the full 
sense requires the social ritual of privacy" because a sense of moral entitle-
ment to oneself does not develop unless we are treated as uniquely "entitled 
to determine when and by whom [our] concrete reality is experienced," when 
and to whom the "contents of [our] consciousness" are revealed, and respect 
for privacy simply is this practice of treating individuals as uniquely entitled 
in just this way.8 
Without participating in a social setting which acknowledges a moral claim 
to privacy, the individual cannot come to see herself as the moral proprietor 
and governor of her body, thoughts, feelings, and decisions, and therefore she 
will not learn to be responsible for them nor to claim moral respect for them. 
She will not, that is, conceive of herself as the sort of being who can hold 
herself and others morally accountable. 
Besides having this ability for accountability, responsible moral agents 
must know what it is to seek and do the good because, upon moral reflection, 
they themselves judge it to be good. To develop this moral talent likewise 
requires a private sphere in which we can practice thinking for ourselves. If every 
piece of moral reflection were immediately reviewed by those whose approval 
we desire or condemnation we fear, very few of us would learn to evaluate ideas 
or actions according to any standard other than what is useful or agreeable. As 
Edward Bloustein affinns, without relief from public scrutiny of thoughts and 
deeds, one's "opinions, being public, tend never to be different; [one's] aspira-
tions, being known, tend always to be conventionally accepted ones. "9 
Probably no other capacities are as fundamental to moral agency as the 
ability to hold oneself and others accountable and the ability to do the good 
because one has oneself judged it good. But out of these capacities grow other 
abilities for relationships proper to mature moral agents. Trust and intimacy 
seem particularly to require human respect for privacy. 
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Speaking very generally, we can say that trusting someone always involves 
the conviction that she will follow through with some piece of behavior (in 
thought or deed) which we have tacitly or explicitly asked of her, or which 
we have given her some reason to think she should do in relation to us. Note 
that we can correctly be said to have trusted someone to perform a particular 
act right before our eyes as when, for example, we trust a conversation partner 
not to lie to us. We also can correctly be said to trust someone whose actions 
we do not observe as when, for example, we trust a friend not to reveal our 
vulnerabilities to those who wish us ill-will. But trusting someone nonethe-
less means that we anticipate their carrying through with the behavior, 
whether or not we are able to detect and to hold them accountable for a breach 
of our trust. If, therefore, we say that we trust our friend not to aid those who 
wish us ill but we nonetheless insist on monitoring her every conversation, 
the friend could rightly complain that we do not trust her after all. 
Trusting, then, always involves the conviction that the person will act the 
way we have agreed (tacitly or explicitly) he will act in relation to us regard-
less of whether we are present to enforce our agreement. This being the case, 
to become worthy of trust we must become the sort of person who can do 
what we have agreed to do whether or not someone is there to see that we 
do it "or else." Now, as Charles Fried. has pointed out, someone who knows 
he is under constant surveillance never has the opportunity to discover 
whether he is in fact trustworthy in this way. Having always had the presence 
of the authority to keep him in line, he never learns the discipline nor knows 
he is capable of gaining the discipline to perform his duty when no one is 
watching. As a consequence, surmises Fried, he also cannot learn to trust 
others. For if he has never experienced being worthy of another's trust he has 
no basis for thinking others are worthy of his. to Without trust, of course, 
intimacy is also impossible. 
There are also more direct connections between respect for privacy and the 
ability for intimate friendships. Imagine either a world in which all automat-
ically know each others' histories, thoughts and feelings or one in which each 
has a right to know such about the other. Either imagined world seems to us 
devoid of the possibility of intimate relationships anything like the sort we 
know in the world as we have it. We draw this conclusion from observations 
of what appear to be fundamental components of intimacy as humans partake 
of it. 
Our primary observation is that intimacy seems always to involve at its 
core a mutual voluntary gift of self. Yet, I can give myself to another only if 
I have a self to give; that is, if I do not first recognize myself as responsibly 
and rightfully independent of the other, then I cannot conceive of myself as 
freely offering myself to the other. And as we noted above, the development 
and maintenance of such a sense of self requires a social structure which 
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recognizes a right to privacy. The significance of this background right also 
lies in this: the beloved's gift of self by disclosure of personal facts and 
private thoughts comes to one as something to which one has no initial right; 
yet this is impossible if our social setting does not recognize a general right 
to limit access to personal information. 
Of course, the gift of self may take forms other than intentional self-dis-
closure. Yet, a crucial form in which it is expressed is the voluntary disclosure 
and exchange of stories about who we are, have been and hope to be. No 
doubt this is in part because intimate relationships are relationships of 
choice-we want and choose to be known by the other. But note that this is 
not all that is operating in the significance of voluntary disclosure. For it does 
not seem to be enough to have retrospective choice, that is, to be glad that 
our friend knows what others told her. Intimacy appears to occur and flourish 
in the telling of what the other recognizes as ours and ours alone to tell-a 
situation, it should be noted, which makes our gift of self really a creation 
of self in the telling of who we understand ourselves to have been and be. 
The worlds without privacy which we asked the reader to imagine would 
make such a point of view impossible. Therefore, without denying that con-
fession of what one knows the other already knows can be charged with 
significance and spur intimacy, we conclude that the features we have de-
scribed and which we locate at the core of the human experience of intimacy 
require the possibility of privacy.ll 
If the above analyses and observations are correct, then at least among 
fellow human beings, respect for privacy is one of the conditions necessary 
for the possibility of becoming responsible moral agents capable of trusting 
and intimate relationships. God, we are assuming, asks that we become re-
sponsible and loving agents. Is divine respect for privacy also necessary for 
attaining this end? If we fail to act towards God as a creator who respects 
our autonomy and privacy, can we achieve this end of mature moral and 
personal development which we assume God wants and asks us to become? 
Reply to (B)-part (iii). Without presuming to settle this question indefeasi-
bly, we will build a strong case for the affirmative by digging out what is at 
stake in the God-human relationship regarding each of the above discussed 
aspects of mature moral agency. We take them in reverse order. 
Intimacy. We have said that fundamental features of intimacy among hu-
mans depend upon our having the right and opportunity to withhold informa-
tion about ourselves. God's knowing all that is true about us would not 
deprive us of the opportunity for spontaneous, fresh self-revelation to a fellow 
human. 12 Would relating to God as One who knows innermost thoughts with-
out our telling and against our will prevent intimacy with God? We argued 
above that our capacity for intimacy requires also a capacity for trust and a 
sense of responsible selfhood and that both of these are linked to our fellow 
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humans' respect for privacy. Thus, a full discussion of intimacy and God 
awaits our discussion of these other aspects of mature moral agency. But it 
is worth our while to consider what consequences for intimacy with God 
follow from the other features of human intimacy examined above. 
We argued that fundamental components of the experience of human inti-
macy require privacy because it allows a voluntary, self-determined giving 
of one's historical, psychological and philosophical story. It follows from this 
that if confessing before God what God already knows is all that is possible, 
then intimacy with God of a sort comparable to what we know through human 
interaction is not possible. Might our relationship with God still be called 
"intimate"? Perhaps in a very attenuated application of the term, yes. But as 
long as our relationship to God lacks truly free and self-determining self-dis-
closure, then the sense in which that relationship is "intimate" has only a 
rather distant analogy to what that term means when we apply it to our 
experience with one another. 
Thus, while our analysis of intimacy, self-disclosure, and privacy does not 
show that intimacy with God is conceptually impossible unless we conceive 
of God as respecting our privacy, we believe it does show that if there is 
intimacy with a non-self-limiting omniscient God, it is intimacy of a different 
order than that known through human interaction. Anyone wishing to argue 
for the view that humans can achieve intimacy with a God who does not 
respect privacy needs to give an account of what characterizes this intimacy 
and what qualifies it as such in the absence of a quality that functions so 
crucially in human intimacy, namely voluntary self-disclosure. And even if 
this can be done, such an account must also deal with whether and how human 
intimacy can be a place for growing into a quite different kind of intimacy 
with God, since theists often assume that the one is preparation for the other. 
Trust. Intimacy, we said earlier, is inconceivable without trust. Regarding 
trust we have said that people learn to be worthy of trust by being trusted 
such that they develop the self-mastery to act as they have been asked to act, 
even though those who trust them would never know of their betrayal. If we 
act towards God as the moral author and judge who "sees" and "hears" all 
things, then it would seem impossible for us to learn either that God trusts 
us or that we are worthy of God's trust. To become worthy of trust I must be 
able to recognize my situation as one in which I have been trusted. If we 
think God observes our every thought, then we do not know that God has 
ever trusted us or that we have ever met the test of God's trust. 
It might be argued against us that God does not need to be able to trust 
humans since God need never be absent. That is, perhaps trust is a virtue only 
among finite creatures. This defense of omniscience, however, takes the dis-
analogy between human interaction and our interaction with God a further 
and even more problematic step. As did the defense of intimacy with God 
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without privacy, this dismissal of divine trust raises the query how our human 
relationships can teach us about love of God. Even more perplexing, however, 
is the obscurity it casts on how God's treatment of us can be a model for our 
treatment of fellow humans. To say that trust is a virtue only among the 
spatio-temporally limited, or that God's omnipresence rather than trust is the 
appropriate model for relationships, suggests that improved use of surveil-
lance techniques is as morally worthy a strategy as nurturing trust-a partic-
ularly dubious conclusion if we wish to affirm trust in God's love as a 
fundamental religious virtue. 
Independent thought. Undergirding trust as trust undergirded intimacy is 
our ability to think, decide and act independently of pressures, threats and 
goads; that is, the ability to make our own reasoned judgment about what is 
good and to do that which we judge good because we do so judge it. We said 
above that human influences and temptations are such that to develop this 
nascent ability most of us need an opportunity away from others' observation 
and judgment. We need human respect for our privacy in order to value and 
encourage within ourselves autonomous moral reflection. Is this true in our 
relationship with God as well? A strong reason for answering in the affirma-
tive is that independent moral thought that leaves no stone unturned must 
conceive the possibility that even the most repugnant ideas are true. This 
suggests that what is finally unthinkable before God must be open to explo-
ration, and consideration of the unthinkable is bound to come more easily 
under a conception of God as listening only when asked. 
A possible response to this argument might be that the required openness 
to considering repulsive ideas might flourish just as well under a conception 
of God as an omniscient but forgiving moral judge who values our process 
of reasoning as much as right conclusions. Such a God could be trusted to 
tolerate-maybe appreciate, maybe even enjoy-mistakes and repugnancies 
in the effort to think creatively, honestly, thoroughly and clearly. If we act 
towards God as One who has at least this kind of desire and respect for our 
autonomy, perhaps we need not also view God as respecting the privacy of 
our reasoning for the sake of this third aspect of mature moral agency. But 
then the puzzle is this: if God values our process of reasoning and is wholly 
prepared to forgive us when we err, why would God monitor it in the first 
place? 
Our position regarding this third aspect of moral agency then, is that there 
is an originally strong argument that a God who intends us to become agents 
capable of independent moral reflection will not monitor our every belief. 
This argument appears initially to be offset by the view of God as One who 
highly values our normative and intellectual search and who is both im-
mensely tolerant and well-prepared to forgive. This rebuttal we believe does 
show convincingly that God need not respect privacy in order to allow us to 
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become independent thinkers, but at the same time it undercuts a major reason 
we might otherwise have for maintaining that God does monitor our thoughts 
and beliefs without our consent. This is because, if we believe that God so 
desires and values our process of autonomous reflection that mistakes and 
repugnancies are morally inconsequential before God, then what reason do 
we further have for thinking God would monitor our thoughts without invi-
tation? Although God could respect our independent judgment and not our 
privacy, if God does respect our independent judgment then the reason for 
God not to respect our privacy is obscure. 
A morally accountable self. Above we said that being the experiencer of 
particular thoughts and feelings is not sufficient for understanding the con-
tents of one's consciousness as belonging to one in a moral sense. In order 
to think of myself as responsible for what I think, feel, and do, and in order 
to think of my thoughts, feelings, and decisions as worthy of others' moral 
respect, I must view the contents of my consciousness as something which I 
uniquely own and govern. This ownership of self is known in the power to 
exert control over others' access to my consciousness, and this is possible 
only where rituals of respect for privacy are generally accepted. The major 
question for us, then, is whether God's lack of a prima facie regard for privacy 
would likewise deprive us of the opportunity of growing into a sense of moral 
self-ownership. 
Let us imagine being aware from our earliest moment that God is "listen-
ing" to our unvoiced speculations and day dreams, whether or not we consent 
to that divine presence. This would be to live in full and unbroken acknowl-
edgement that our private mulIings may be unwanted performances and, 
therefore, that the content of our consciousness is not uniquely ours. By right 
of access, it belongs as well to an Other. As a result, the sense of unique 
responsibility for one's thoughts which one might otherwise develop is se-
verely attenuated; the opportunity to take possession of oneself, so to speak, 
is nullified. It is very doubtful that out of such a weakened sense of respon-
sibility or self-possession there could come an agent who accepts full respon-
sibility for her beliefs and actions and recognizes fellow humans as likewise 
accountable. Furthermore, we have said above that this sense of responsible 
selfhood undergirds our ability to act upon autonomous moral reflection, to 
trust and be trustworthy, and to enter intimate relationships. Therefore, the 
significant doubt cast upon our ability to become selves if God does not 
respect our privacy strengthens our case that these other abilities require 
privacy before God. 
Our conclusion regarding selfhood and divine respect for privacy has been 
derived by imagining what it would be like to always live as if God "heard" 
all, whether we consented or not. To this conclusion it could be objected that 
this is not the actual situation in which we find ourselves. The typical sin-
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ner-that is, almost anyone of us-lives as though God is not present, even 
if God does not respect her privacy. Thus, isn't it enough, the challenge would 
go, that God has made us such that we can ignore God's presence and com-
plete knowledge of us; for by allowing us an illusion of privacy, God provides 
the condition we need to develop a sense of autonomous selfhood. 
A little reflection shows, we think, that this proposed rebuttal to our posi-
tion describes a situation God could not bring about. For on this hypothesis 
it follows that the person who is ignorant of God's knowledge of the private, 
or who has the false belief that God does not have such knowledge, is in a 
position to fulfill God's purpose and command to attain autonomous selfhood, 
while one with knowledge of the truth is not. But, surely, a morally perfect 
being would not make it the case that knowledge of the truth would prevent 
fulfillment of that being's purpose for us. 
Note well that our objection is to conceiving God as offering us no choice 
regarding self-disclosure and not against striving for the spiritual depth to 
place heart and mind constantly before God. A responsible self's voluntary 
decision to welcome God into every moment of his thinking is not only 
conceptually possible, it is perhaps the highest ideal of the religious life. Far 
from detracting from this traditional ideal our argument underscores it. This is 
so because once one conceives of God as One who respects privacy, the choice 
to share one's innermost self with God becomes more significant than ever. 
Reply to (B)-summary. In this section we examined, by comparison with 
human disregard for privacy, the detrimental effects which divine disregard 
for privacy can be expected to have on our ability to become the sort of beings 
who have a sense of the moral accountability for ourselves and others and 
who can enter relationships of trust and intimacy. We have concluded that, 
despite a degree of difference between the experience and development of 
these capacities in interaction with humans and their experience and devel-
opment in interaction with God, the balance of considerations falls on the 
side of a need for divine respect for privacy. Therefore, in so far as we 
conceive of God as wanting and commanding us to become mature moral 
agents, we must think of God as having a prima facie moral regard for our 
privacy. This is the case even if, as objection (B) claims, the authority God 
possesses as creator would initially seem to alleviate God of any responsibility 
to respect our autonomy. The God who has not merely created us, but specifically 
created us for mature moral agency and has commanded us to fulfill that purpose, 
could not morally make it impossible for us to fulfill that commandment. 
4 
Reply to (C). A third way of defeating the claim that God ought to respect 
our privacy and/or will do so as a condition of realizing the divine purpose 
382 Faith and Philosophy 
for us is to mount an overriding case for divine omniscience not limited in 
the way we propose. 
The obvious conceptual consideration in this regard is God's perfection and 
worthiness for worship. Knowledge is a great-making quality and God nec-
essarily possesses the maximal instance of it. Thus, to our proposal, one might 
object that an individual ignorant of our private concerns cannot be God, and 
cannot, therefore, be that perfect being who alone is worthy of worship. Our 
response is equally obvious. Surely the judgment about maximal perfection 
is an overall one, a jUdgment which takes account of all the attributes of a 
perfect being. And if perfect goodness dictates that there are things such a 
being could know if it were morally appropriate, but necessarily will not 
know if it is wrong to do so, then the scope of omniscience will be consistent 
with divine goodness. 13 
Nor do we think we have impugned the majesty and worshipfulness of God 
by setting limits to divine omniscience. A being who fails to show respect 
where respect is due is neither majestic nor worthy of worship. It would 
seem that the burden of proof rests with our position, but if it has been 
persuasively argued, then it represents no threat to the majesty and 
worshipfulness of God. 
A second kind of objection in an overriding case against divine respect for 
privacy concerns features of God's overall purpose for us with which we 
agree and which, on the face of it, require divine knowledge of the private 
sphere of our life. Traditionally, God is providentially active in forming our 
characters and will judge the outcome with perfect justice. But how can God 
do the former without error unless God knows fully what we are like and thus 
what effect on our character events are likely to have? And how can God 
judge with perfect justice and yet fail to have all relevant information about 
us? 
These matters are not, of course, easy to decide. Our answers to both have 
a similar form. Surely, among the effects of events upon us with which God 
is concerned will be that of how uninvited divine knowledge of us affects our 
moral development and our capacity for trust and intimacy. Assuming that 
these things are central to God's purpose for us and that our reasoning about 
the role of privacy in their development is correct, then God will providen-
tially interact with us accordingly, guided by an errorless but self-limited 
knowledge. 
Similarly with God's judgment. We have argued that divine respect for 
privacy is plausibly a necessary condition of our development as moral 
agents. God cannot hold us accountable while violating the conditions which 
make possible our capacity for moral responsibility. Whatever the mode of 
God's perfect justice, it must be consistent with the conditions necessary for 
holding us accountable in the first place. 14 
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Finally there are matters of religious practice, as well as psychological and 
religious considerations, which seem at first to weigh against the view of God 
we are proposing. The most important, perhaps, is that among human desires 
arguably the deepest and most religiously significant is the desire for uncon-
ditional acceptance. But does not God's unconditional love require the belief 
that God knows all there is to know about us? Our response is that belief in 
God's unconditional love is a conviction to be held with absolute trust, and 
if we cannot realize our capacity for trust apart from divine respect for 
privacy, then God will not undercut the condition required to develop that 
capacity. We show our trust in the divine promise of unconditional love 
precisely in revealing to God those matters we deem private. 
In this connection, we should underscore a point made above, namely, that 
on the view we propose the highest ideal of the religious life might be seen 
as the responsible self's free choice of God's presence in every moment of 
her thinking. It might be argued, to the contrary, that the religious life's ideal 
of complete self-knowledge before God could only be formulated and moti-
vated by recognizing that we are already known perfectly by God. God's 
perfect knowledge of us, on this alternative view, would serve as a continuous 
invitation and challenge to overcome our fragmentary and distorted self-
knowledge. The ideal is to come to know ourselves as we are known by God. 
This alternative ideal is plausible. However, it overlooks the fact that in 
matters of privacy, our struggle is over whether we will reveal to others what 
we know, or think we know, about ourselves. In developing intimate human 
relationships, our struggle for self-knowledge is focussed on the choice of 
what we will and will not disclose to the other. Why do we hide (or reveal) 
this fact about ourselves and not that one? Surely the drama and significance 
which such choices hold for self-knowledge would be heightened all the more 
in the presence of an Other whom we trust to love us unconditionally. 
Indeed, we suggest that there is much in this view which is religiously 
attractive. A conception of God's relationship to us which makes a virtue of 
human autonomy and dignity is, to modems at least, bound to seem preferable 
to one which requires compromise of a cherished value. The ancient conun-
drum associated with prayer-why pray when God knows already the secrets 
of our hearts?-is dispelled with the view that, in part, prayer is genuine 
disclosure of that which God would not otherwise know. And a theology 
which can argue analogously from interpersonal matters, knowledge about 
which we have confidence, to the character of our relationship to a personal 
God, is to be preferred, we think, to an austere agnosticism which leaves 
religious belief and practice shrouded in obscurity. 
5 
The idea of God as one who respects our privacy, we realize, does not fit 
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well with theistic tradition and its devotional practice. As we have reflected 
on the matter, however, we have come to think that a strong case can be made 
for thinking about God in this way, a way which is religiously attractive in 
a culture which values human autonomy. We have not considered the possi-
bility that God who is obliged or will benevolently choose to respect our 
privacy will have overriding reasons to know us completely. Such consider-
ation would require a separate essay. But if our reasoning is sound about the 
connection between privacy and moral accountability, such morally overrid-
ing reasons would have to be strong indeed. A God who does not override 
our significant freedom to do great harm to ourselves and one another seems 
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